Accra: Northern Ghana is currently not engulfed in conflict, but the perceived stability is deceptive when considering the broader Sahel threat that predominantly affects Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Benin. In Mali, the government controls less than half of the country's territory, with the coalition Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, affiliated with al-Qaeda, dominating significant areas and even laying siege to Bamako in 2025.
According to Ghana Web, military juntas in the Sahel have justified their coups by pointing to the failure of civilian governments to manage jihadist insurgencies. These juntas have sought security assistance from Russia's Africa Corps after expelling French troops, but the situation remains dire. The jihadist-controlled territories in the Sahel have expanded post-coups, and the Africa Corps have been accused of committing atrocities against civilians, such as the Moura massacre in Mali.
The fundamental issue remains unresolved as mercenary troops prioritize regime protection and resource extraction over public safety. This arrangement perpetuates a cycle of financial incentives that foster instability. Consequently, the juntas have replaced flawed democratic oversight with a security partnership lacking accountability, resulting in increased terrorism.
Analysts warn of a calculated advance by various factions aiming for the Atlantic coast through Benin, Togo, C´te d'Ivoire, and northern Ghana. The Nyansa Institute emphasizes the importance of African-led solutions to the continent's challenges. In this context, Ghana is urged to take decisive leadership in addressing the Sahel threat.
Ghana has not been entirely inactive; the country hosts the Accra Initiative, a security coalition involving Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo, and C´te d'Ivoire, which has led to numerous arrests through joint operations and intelligence sharing. Additionally, a $40 million Coastal States Stability Mechanism, supported by the US and Germany, alongside a domestic BORDER Project, aims to secure the northern regions. However, these efforts alone are insufficient to address the magnitude of the threat.
Ghana must act decisively as a regional leader by focusing on counter-terrorism finance, governance at its peripheries, and cooperation with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). A UN report highlights the lack of equipment, training, and legal authority to take necessary actions in the North East and Upper East areas of Ghana. Issues such as the untracked movement of materials used in improvised explosives need urgent attention.
Rather than viewing the northern border purely as a security issue, the government should address the governance gaps. In Mali, jihadists have exploited the lack of state presence to impose taxes and govern territories. The Ghanaian government should engage with the AES juntas without bias, maintaining communication with Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey as a positive step, although these interactions should yield actionable agreements and genuine intelligence collaborations.
The window for Ghana to lead against the Sahel threat is limited. Benin's previous dismissal of warning signs resulted in severe consequences. Ghana must commit to its northern border communities, establish a rapid response mechanism through the Accra Initiative, and address terrorism financing loopholes identified by the UNODC.
Ghana's future hinges on the operational effectiveness of existing institutions like the Accra Initiative, the BORDER Project, and its engagement with the AES. The threat from the Sahel is not a distant theory but a pressing reality. Ghana's democratic frameworks, institutions, and soft power should be harnessed to counter the extremist threat, honoring the legacy of Nkrumah's guiding vision.