Accra: A recent article titled 'The Difference Between Knowing and Seeing: Why Intelligence Services in Africa Are Still Fighting the Last War' has sparked a significant debate regarding the state of intelligence services in Ghana. The former Director-General of the Bureau of National Intelligence (BNI) presents a critical view of the country's intelligence framework, raising questions about the quality of intelligence analysis and its impact on national decision-making.
According to Ghana Web, the former Director-General's critique has been met with skepticism, particularly regarding his conceptual framework and the sweeping judgments made about the professional competence of Ghanaian intelligence services. The article underscores a critical issue: the failure to adequately distinguish between intelligence and counterintelligence. Intelligence, as defined by Mark Lowenthal, encompasses the process of identifying, collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating national security information. In contrast, counterintelligence safeguards these processes and intersects with various functions such as human intelligence, security, and law enforcement.
The distinction between intelligence and counterintelligence is crucial in the Ghanaian context. Under Ghana's Security and Intelligence Agencies Acts, the Internal Intelligence Agency is responsible for counterintelligence, internal security, and intelligence related to violent extremism, terrorism, and organized crime. The article argues that it is misleading to view criminal investigation, security intelligence, and counterintelligence as separate entities. Instead, they are interrelated components of security intelligence.
Furthermore, the article critiques the former Director-General's characterization of the BNI as a 'criminal intelligence' organization. It argues that such a conclusion requires more evidence, as much of the Bureau's work in counterintelligence and internal intelligence remains deliberately invisible. Successful counterintelligence often prevents adversaries' activities before they become public, making the absence of visible outcomes an unreliable measure of intelligence activity.
The article also highlights the Bureau's historical role in providing timely intelligence on national security threats, despite policy-makers' failures to act on these insights. For instance, intelligence provided by the Bureau during various coup d'©tats and conflicts was often ignored by the government, leading to preventable crises. The differing responses of political traditions, particularly the New Patriotic Party's (NPP) handling of the Western Togoland issue, further illustrate the challenges faced by the intelligence services.
The article also questions the former Director-General's authority to critique the intelligence services, given his tenure and lack of career intelligence experience. It points out that his leadership decisions, including the prioritization of political intelligence, may have contributed to the issues he now critiques. The article suggests that his focus on political power maximization, rather than addressing pressing matters like illegal mining, undermined the Bureau's capabilities.
Finally, the article emphasizes the need for a comprehensive debate on whether the Bureau's collective functions meet Ghana's national security requirements. It argues for a focus on intelligence doctrine, professional experience, and evidence-based assessments rather than sweeping declarations. The piece concludes that while Ghana's intelligence framework is not without flaws, the challenges highlighted by the former Director-General do not accurately reflect the realities facing the Bureau.