IMF Highlights Political Influence as a Major Weakness in Ghana’s State-Owned Enterprises

Accra: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has identified the politicisation of board and executive appointments as a critical weakness undermining the governance and performance of Ghana's state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In its July 2026 Technical Assistance Report, the IMF highlighted concerns about the heavy political influence in the appointments of board members and top executives in major state-owned entities, despite efforts to establish a more merit-based system.

According to Ghana Web, the IMF report emphasized that board and CEO appointments remain highly politicised, with active politicians and high-level officials occupying many board seats. This situation, the report noted, undermines the independence and professionalism of SOE boards. While Ghana has established a framework intended to ensure more transparent and merit-based nominations for directors and chief executives, the system is still in its early stages. In practice, appointments remain highly political and centralised in the Presidency.

The IMF specifically cited the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA) and the Volta River Authority (VRA) as examples of this politicisation. The report revealed that boards of major SOEs are largely dominated by political appointees, with board chairs frequently being ministers, members of parliament, or prominent party officials. For instance, the newly inaugurated 10-member board of GPHA is chaired by the national chairman of the governing party, while the VRA board includes prominent politicians, technocrats, and a traditional leader. The Fund highlighted that such arrangements deviate significantly from international corporate governance standards, which discourage active politicians from serving on SOE boards and stress the importance of independent and professional board membership.

The IMF also expressed concerns about the process of appointing chief executives of SOEs, noting that these appointments remain largely political, with boards having limited influence. Typically, the CEO or Managing Director is appointed by the President, often in consultation with the relevant minister, rather than being selected by the SOE board through a competitive process. The IMF warned that this arrangement weakens the accountability relationship between boards and management, potentially discouraging boards from challenging management decisions and creating incentives for CEOs to respond more to political authorities than to the boards responsible for overseeing their performance.

In response, the IMF has recommended that Ghana introduce a merit-based selection process for SOE boards and executive management, especially for enterprises deemed critical to the economy. It urged a gradual reduction in the number of active politicians and high-level government officials serving on SOE boards, recommending their replacement with independent professionals and sector experts. The report also called for the full implementation of Ghana's Code of Corporate Governance, including mandatory board charters, codes of ethics, annual evaluations, and training. Furthermore, the IMF advocated for systematic disclosure of board and committee structures, attendance, and evaluation findings, to be enforced and included in annual reports and published on SOE websites.

These governance concerns arise amidst significant financial challenges facing Ghana's SOE sector. The IMF reported that aggregate SOE liabilities rose dramatically from GHS35 billion in 2015 to GHS282 billion in 2024, equivalent to about 25 percent of GDP. It identified the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), VRA, and Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) among the entities posing the greatest fiscal risks. The report noted that Ghana's SOE portfolio recorded aggregate net losses of GHS9.7 billion in 2024, despite total revenues rising to GHS133 billion.

The IMF argued that persistent financial underperformance, combined with weak corporate governance, political interference, and insufficient enforcement of existing rules, continues to expose public finances to significant risks. It pointed out three systemic weaknesses: politicised appointments, insufficient separation of ownership and policy roles, and weak SOE transparency. The report highlighted that active political representation on boards undermines the independence and professionalism of SOE boards.

The IMF concluded that addressing these weaknesses would require Ghana to operationalise its merit-based nomination framework, reduce political representation on boards, enforce the Corporate Governance Code, and strengthen disclosure requirements. These recommendations are part of the IMF's broader call for Ghana to improve SOE governance, strengthen fiscal risk management, and ensure that state-owned enterprises deliver sustainable value to the economy and public finances.