Accra: On July 30, 2026, the Attorney-General, Dominic Ayine, stood at Jubilee House and delivered what the government described as the most significant constitutional reform package in a generation. The proposed amendments included ten headline recommendations, such as a five-year presidential term, a younger candidate age, elected district chief executives, and capped ministries. While these changes appear to modernize the nation, they might merely treat the symptoms rather than the root cause of the issues facing Ghana's political system.
According to Ghana Web, the Constitution Review Committee, chaired by Professor Kwasi Prempeh, identified a significant problem: the presidency holds too much power. Ghanaians, despite being unable to pinpoint the specific article that grants such power, believe that the executive's authority is more about accumulated practice, appointment discretion, and control over the state's purse than written text. The Committee also noted citizens' dissatisfaction with the management of oil and gas wealth, the lack of continuity in development plans across administrations, and the high cost of politics, which deters those without financial backing.
The Committee proposed several changes to address these concerns. Extending the presidential and parliamentary term from four to five years, however, does not limit presidential power-it merely extends the duration of an already unconstrained office. Similarly, capping the number of ministers and parliamentarians addresses quantity, not the power dynamics within the government. Electing district chief executives is a positive step toward decentralization, but it does not fundamentally alter power structures at the national level.
On the fiscal side, the Committee recommended tighter constitutional conditions on when the Bank of Ghana can finance the government directly and a requirement for Parliament to enact a binding debt management framework. These proposals aim to constrain presidential power by regulating financial mechanisms. Yet, the Committee intentionally left the specifics of debt ratios to ordinary legislation, which can be easily altered by a determined majority in Parliament, typically controlled by the executive.
The report also highlighted citizens' concerns regarding the benefits from oil and gas resources. Despite acknowledging this issue, the 127-page report and the government's response fail to propose a mechanism to change the ownership or management of these resources. The lack of entrenched national equity stakes or a protected heritage-fund framework means that resource wealth remains vulnerable to government changes and budgetary manipulations.
This constitutional review mirrors a similar process from 2011, which identified the same concentration of presidential power and lack of cross-administration continuity, yet resulted in insufficient reforms. Fourteen years later, the same issues persist, with the latest proposals offering procedural adjustments without significant structural changes.
Ghana needs a checked presidency, where appointment powers are subject to legislative or judicial veto, fiscal discipline is entrenched rather than legislated, and a resource-revenue architecture is constitutionally safeguarded. This approach, exemplified by Botswana's stability through institutional frameworks like Debswana and the Pula Fund, could help Ghana achieve lasting reform. However, the current proposals, like those before them, fall short of providing a robust solution to the underlying challenges.